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Software Estimates: 
A Maintenance Metaphor 
Tarek K. Abdel-Hamid, Naval Postgraduate School 
software 
he difficult problem of software cost and schedule estimation remains 
unresolved. While a number of estimation models have been developed 
in recent years, their utility has proven to be poor. Consequently, few 
development organizations rely on them, and the organizations that do 
often use them only to check manual estimates. 
The reason estimating software projects has been problematic is no mystery: 
Estimates of effort and cost must be done at a time when the values of many factors 
driving software development are unknown quantities. This applies both to 
product factors (such as product size and complexity) and to organization factors 
(such as staff skill and turnover rate). 
Continuous software 
estimation models 
are needed that can 
constantly evaluate 
costs and schedules. 
This article proposes 
a hybrid estimation 
model and 
demonstrates how 
to use it. 
As it progresses through the software development life cycle (SDLC), a product 
becomes better defined and uncertainties about the organizational parameters 
ease up. Software estimation researchers and practitioners have thus argued that 
estimating done at the beginning of a software project should not be considered 
unalterable.’ Rather, estimation should be a continuous process enhanced through 
constant updates of feedback data collected from project monitoring and control 
activities. Londeix put it this way2: 
By comparing the actual data with the estimated data at each step, the accuracy of the next 
step-estimate can be improved. A large-scale project can often take a few years to 
complete, and during that time the development capability might change or an improved 
awareness of the initial conditions might be obtained. Thus, there is a great deal of scope 
for improving the estimate. At  each step there is a need to be able to better predict future 
steps. 
The continuous estimation “message” to the software project manager has been 
simple: “Just do it.” Implicit in such a message is the premise that the current 
generation of models is well suited to support a continuous estimation process. In 
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this article, I challenge that premise and 
propose a set of capabilities that genu- 
inely continuous models need and most 
current models lack. 
The maintenance 
metaphor 
Let us characterize the continuous 
estimation process - the “it” in “just 
do it.” Defining the meaning of a truly 
continuous estimation process is es- 
sential before we can address the issue 
of what types of models can support it 
and how. The prevalent characteriza- 
tion views the continuous estimation 
process as one of continuously cor- 
recting project estimates during the 
SDLC.* 
This is a limiting characterization, 
reminiscent of early portrayals of soft- 
ware maintenance as an activity to cor- 
rect lingering software errors. Gradual- 
ly, software engineers realized that 
software maintenance comprises a rich- 
er set of activities for adapting, correct- 
ing, and perfecting the software system 
to keep it operational, responsive, and 
synchronized with an evolving user and 
operational environment. 
Continuous estimation seeks to ac- 
complish for initial project estimates 
what software maintenance seeks to 
accomplish for the software product. In 
maintenance, the adaptive activity of- 
ten accommodates new system or user 
requirements or reflects new organiza- 
tional realities (such as new govern- 
ment reporting requirements). Similar- 
ly, a software estimate often needs to be 
adapted to accommodate new organi- 
zational realities (for example, staffing 
constraints at any point in the SDLC or 
even at the project’s initiation). 
Corrective maintenance remedies an 
error detected in the software product. 
In software estimation, corrective ac- 
tion is often needed to correct initial 
assumptions that turn out to be faulty 
(for example, about product size). 
Finally, perfective maintenance elim- 
inates processing inefficiencies and en- 
hances performance of the overall soft- 
ware system. For software estimation, 
poor initial estimation can lead to project 
inefficiencies (for example, in staffing). 
This creates a need for project postmor- 
tems to normalize (or perfect) project 
statistics and thus improve their utility 
as bases of future estimates. 
Model capabilities to 
support continuous 
estimation 
To support adaptive, corrective, and 
perfective estimation activities, genu- 
inely continuous models must have cer- 
tain capabilities. 
Continuous-time modeling. Accord- 
ing to Curtis: one serious limitation of 
current models is their treatment of the 
software development process “as dis- 
crete rather than continuous in time.” 
For example, when current models ad- 
vise midstream corrections, most limit 
such corrections to discrete adjustments 
at the project’s major SDLC milestones. 
The following quotes indicate the strat- 
egy i 
“The procedures are oriented around 
the collection of information and 
the updating of the software prod- 
uct’s Cocomo (Constructive cost 
model) estimates at the project’s 
major life-cycle mile~tones.”~ 
*“At  the end of each development 
phase or build, the manager should 
reestimate project size, effort, and 
schedule for inclusion in the soft- 
ware developmentlmanagement 
plan.”5 
“It is very important to continually 
reestimate effort and cost and to 
compare targets against actual ex- 
penditure at each major milestone.”6 
These examples reinforce the tradi- 
tional view of software development as 
a discrete set of SDLC phases. In reality, 
the software artifact changes continu- 
ously - not in discrete jumps that are 
conveniently synchronized with the 
project’s major milestones. Results of 
well-documented case studies at the 
Software Engineering Laboratory5 clear- 
ly indicate a pattern of continuous, not 
discrete, changes over time. The organi- 
zational system’s human intensive pro- 
cesses are never static. “Both the prob- 
lems and the people are in constant flux 
. . . Even with a stable population, the 
people continually learn new skills and 
find different ways to solve  problem^."^ 
Even management’s major decisions on 
a project, which do appear as discrete 
events, are in fact continuous in nature. 
This has been accepted in the literature 
of organizational dynamics for 30 yeama 
Capture management-system dynam- 
ics. The continuous estimation view- 
point rests on the premise that initial 
project plans do not necessarily consti- 
tute the best course of action to take 
during the project life cycle. Initial plans 
merely show what was considered best 
when the plan was formulated. Since 
actual events on a software project al- 
most always differ from the assumed 
events the plans were designed to meet, 
project managers must react continu- 
ously to real-world events, not to those 
that might have occurred had the real 
world been kind enough to conform to 
the initial planning assumptions. 
Research findings indicate that man- 
agerial interventions can affect project 
performance in significant ~ a y s . 7 ~ J ~ T h e  
impact can be direct (for example, over- 
lapping phases, eliminating require- 
ments) or indirect (for example, adding 
staff, investing in new technology). In- 
corporating managerial decision-mak- 
ing dynamics into continuous estima- 
tion models should not only increase 
the fidelity of such models, but should 
also enable management to search for 
and test alternative interventions on a 
continuous basis. For example, if a sched- 
ule slippage occurs during the SDLC, 
the manager should be able to evaluate 
a range of options available (for in- 
stance, schedule extensions with no staff- 
ing changes, fixed schedules with addi- 
tional staff, or a combination of the 
two). Organizational behavior research- 
ers have long known that without such a 
facility, project feedback will only lead 
to frustration and perhaps defensive 
behavior as the manager confronts a 
poor-performance indicator with no idea 
how to correct it. 
Computer-based simulation. “Not 
learning anything from a bad estimate is 
unforgivable,” according to DeMarco.” 
Yet, software project managers do this 
all the time. 
For example, it is nearly unheard of to 
conduct a software project postmortem. 
Except in the most successful projects, 
everyone scurries off at the end without 
even taking note of the actual total cost. 
Estimates for the next project are made as 
though the last project never happened, 
and no one benefits from past mistakes. If . 
aircraft manufacturers were so cavalier 
about analysis of their failures (crashes), 
the public would be outraged. But in our 
field, ignoring the lessons of the past is the 
invariant rule. Of course, it ought not be 
that way; we ought to go poring over the 
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wreckage of our failures, analyzing and 
looking for patterns in just the way that 
airplane investigators do.“ 
We need to exploit software project 
experiences to perfect software esti- 
mates, but dissecting a project experi- 
ence to discern what worked and what 
didn’t is not an easy task. The software 
project environment is a complex web 
of interrelated factors where cause and 
effect are often remote from each other 
in both time and space. 
Over the past three decades, the work 
of Forrester and others in system dy- 
namics has demonstrated both the fea- 
sibility and the utility of constructing 
computer-based simulation models to 
serve as diagnostic experimentation 
vehicles for management systems. 
These simulation models have three 
benefits over analytical models. First, 
Constructive cost model 
Cocomo (an abbreviation for 
Constructive cost model) is one of 
the most widely accepted and ap- 
plied models for software effort 
and schedule estimation. It was 
developed at TRW; Boehm ex- 
plains it in full detail? 
Development effort in person- 
months (PM) and time for devel- 
opment (TDev) in months are 
modeled with power functions of 
the form 
PM = a * (size)b * E, 
TOev = c * (PM)d 
where a, b, c, and dare constants 
that change with the level of the 
estimate desired. Cocomo pro- 
vides a hie ree increas- 
ingly detait project es- 
timation: basic, intermediate, and 
detailed. Size is the principal fac- 
tor that influences effort, but 15 
around time), the pe 
example, programmer capability), 
and the project environment (for 
example, use of modern program- 
ming practices). 
their causal structure provides a superi- 
or explanatory power. By contrast, re- 
gression-based models might expose a 
statistical relationship between devel- 
opment factors and effort, but such 
models provide little understanding of 
why or under what conditions the rela- 
tionship exists. 
Second, the solution of analytical 
models usually specifies only the termi- 
nal or steady state that eventually re- 
sults from changing the values of the 
controlled variables. Such models do 
not specify the intermediate transition- 
al states. Computer-based simulation 
models expose the system’s continuous 
transitions to the most rigorous study. 
The third and perhaps most attrac- 
tive benefit of simulation models is con- 
trolled experimentation. This was clearly 
stated by Forrester, the “father” of sys- 
tem dynamics: 
The effects of different assumptions and 
environmental factors can be tested. In 
the model system, unlike the real systems, 
the effect of changing one factor can be 
observed while all other factors are held 
unchanged. Such experimentation will 
yield new insights into the characteristics 
of the system that the model represents. 
By using a model of a complex system, 
more can be learned about internal 
interactions than would ever be possible 
through manipulation of the real system. 
Internally, the model provides complete 
control of the system’s organizational 
structure, its policies, and its sensitivities 
to various events.8 
Using continuous estimation models, 
the software manager, like the engi- 
neer, can simulate project behavior to 
get answers quickly and economically 
that would seldom be obtainable from 
an informal postmortem analysis. 
Model implementation 
The Naval Postgraduate School re- 
search group that I headed developed a 
model with the required capabilities to 
demonstrate the feasibility and utility 
of continuous estimation. It couples the 
system dynamics (SD) simulator of soft- 
ware development by Abdel-Hamid and 
Madnicklo with a variety of algorithmic 
estimators. This article discusses an 
implementation using Boehm’s Coco- 
mo4 (see the sidebar) and the SD simu- 
lator. Cocomo is programmed in C, while 
the SD simulator is implementedin Pro- 
fessional Dynamo Plus (PD+). The two 
models are interfaced through a C/PD+ 
DOS interface. Figure 1 shows this hy- 
brid model. 
The user engages the system through 
an interface that initiates the estima- 
tion process by eliciting a set of inputs. 
For Cocomo, these inputs include an 
estimate of project size and the values 
of the 15 cost drivers. The Cocomo 
module then calculates three estimates: 
effort, duration, and the project’s pro- 
ductivity index (estimated project size 
in delivered source instructions divided 
by estimated effort). 
In addition to the Cocomo drivers, 
the SD simulator requires two addi- 
tional types of inputs: (1) parameters 
used to  characterize the organiza- 
tional system (for example, turnover 
rate and hiring delays), and ( 2 )  man- 
agement policies (for example, for 
hiring and training). (Abdel-Hamid 
and Madnick explain the parameters 
in detail.l0) 
For initial planning purposes, the hy- 
brid model produces two types of esti- 
mates: (1) point predictions (such as 
cost and duration) and (2) continuous 
projections (such as staff loading over 
time). As the project progresses, all 
model variables can be adjusted in real 
time to reflect improved knowledge 
(such as about size and productivity). 
Additionally, implications of different 
managerial interventions can be evalu- 
ated. At project completion, the model 
can serve as an experimentation vehicle 
for postmortem analysis. 
Model demonstration 
Below, three examples demonstrate 
how the model can be used before the 
project starts to adapt the Cocomo esti- 
mates to organizational realities, dur- 
ing software development to correct 
initial assumptions about sizing, and after 
project completion to perfect model 
estimates. 
Adapting initial estimates to organi- 
zational realities. The accurate projec- 
tion of required staff levels is a critical 
function in software development: 
Improper staffing and schedules, often 
short of real needs, may lead to delays for 
customers, compromised methodology, 
volatile priorities, inadequate testing, poor 
product quality, and low project produc- 
tivity. Projects that are correctly staffed 
and scheduled generally satisfy commit- 
ments to customers and favor increased 
productivity.’* 
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Figure 1. The hybrid model structure. 
The project’s average staffing level is 
calculated in Cocomo (as well as in most 
current-generation models) by dividing 
the estimated effort in person-months 
by the estimated duration in months. To 
develop a detailed month-by-month 
personnel plan, average estimates are 
calculated using Cocomo’s SDLC phase 
distributions of effort and schedule. 
Given these average personnel levels by 
phase and activity; given the P E R T  
[Program evaluation and review technique] 
chart connecting phase, activitv a n d  
calendar time; and given the initial WBS 
[work-breakdown structure] breakdown 
of activity by task, we can construct a 
detailed personnel plan indicating how 
many people will be needed for each task 
during each month of the project.‘ 
This, of course, assumes that the esti- 
mated staff resources will be available 
when needed. Often, this is not the case. 
In fact, negotiating and obtaining staff 
resources is a major task for project 
managers. 
The reality of staffing limitations is 
addressed only obliquely, if at all, in the 
estimation literature. For Cocomo, 
Boehm asserts that “Typically. the per- 
sonnel plan will take three or four iter- 
ations to converge.”4The iterations are, 
however, conducted without altering the 
Cocomo estimate for effort in person- 
months (and. hence. for productivity). 
That is. staffing needs are reconciled 
with staffing availability outside the es- 
timation model (that is, while holding 
the effort and productivity estimates 
constant). Figure 2a shows this process. 
This reconciliation process is, howev- 
er, inconsistent with research findings 
indicating that workforce size deter- 
mines communication and training over- 
heads. which affect the team’s produc- 
tivity and ultimately the cost and sched- 
ule of the project.’ Indeed, Jeffery’s 
empirical results indicate that staff lev- 
el affects productivity more than all other 
drivers except product size. This sug- 
gests that Figure 2a should be modified 
so that changes in resource constraints 
directly impact the initial estimation 
Available 
resources 





Estimates Inputs Estimation -*Final estimates 
Figure 2. Adapting estimates to staffing limitations: common practice (a); pro- 
posed strategy (b). 
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process/mechanism, as shown in Fig- 
ure 2b. 
In the system dynamicssimulator (see 
the sidebar), the causal loop structure 
of Figure 3 captures the circular rela- 
tionships among cost/schedule estimates, 
workforce size, and productivity. On 
one hand. cost and schedule estimates 
directly influence workforce level (for 
example, desired staff size is calculated 
by dividing estimated cost by estimated 
duration), while the workforce level 
affects project schedule and cost. 
In addition, cost/schedule estimates 
can influence project behavior through 
more subtle and less direct means. For 
System dynamics simulator 
as opposed to analytical. Values are computed at dis 
where the intervals are very small. An integration, for exa 
the following form: 
WF, = WF, + (DT)(HR,k - FR,J 
where WF equals workforce, k equals now, j equal 
equals computation interval for the simulation, HR 
equals time interval from j to k, and FR equals firin 
Thus, the above equation states that the current 
(WF,) is computed from its most recent past value 
inflows and outflows that occurred in t 
simulation parameter DT represents a very small i 
as the length of simulated time between the previous c 
present (k). By rearranging the equation to read 
example, if a project is perceived to be 
behind schedule, software developers 
might feel pressured to work harder to 
bring the project back on schedule. This 
phenomenon is called the “deadline ef- 
fec t .”4 
The simulator uses the feedback mech- 
anism in Figure 3 to directly adapt Co- 
como’s initial estimates to staff avail- 
ability. To demonstrate this capability, 
consider a scenario in which the initial 
estimates for a new project must be 
adapted to a staff shortage. This short- 
age might be the result of competition 
for resources among multiple concur- 
rent projects. 
Assume the new project (project N) 
has an estimated 64 KDSI (kilo - or 
thousand - delivered source instruc- 
tions). Table 1 summarizes Cocomo’s 
initial estimates. Next, assume a second 
ongoing project (project 0) has a cur- 
rent staffing of 11 people and is sched- 
uled to complete in 200 working days. 
Further, assume that the total available 
staff is 16 (that is, 75 percent of what is 
required for the two projects). With 
project 0 employing 11 people, project 
N is left with only five full-time staff in 
its startup phase. 
One possible staffing plan for project 
N would be to start the project with the 
five available people and add addition- 
al people later in the SDLC when project 
0 releases its staff. To compensate for 
the initial staff deficit and minimize 
schedule overrun, the plan would entail 
building project N‘s staff to a higher 
level than originally estimated. Figure 
4a shows this adapted staffing plan. (As 
we see that for small values of DT, the equation is a discrete approximation 
of the differential equation 
-- d(WF(t)) - HR(t) - FR(t) 
di 
Variables in the model are defined as arrays. This a 
configured to simulate multiple concurrent projects. 
nick discuss the model’s structure, mathematical f 
in detail.’* 
Further reading 
For more information about the system dynam 
rester, lndusftial Dynamics (MIT Press, Cambrid 
Wolstenholme, System Enquiry: A System Dyna 
and Sons, New York, 1990). 
I 
Figure 3. Circular relationship between 
estimates, workforce size, and produc- 
tivity. 
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Table 1 Cocomo’s initial estimates. Table 2. Comparison of the initial and adapted estimates. 
Project Values for 
Characteristics Project N 
Size (KDSI) 64.0 
Effort (Person-days) 3,593.0 
Development time (Days) 348.0 
Staff level (People) 
Design 8.7 
Programming 11.7 
Integration and testing 8.7 
the sidebar indicates, the hybrid model 
is capable of simulating multiple con- 
current projects.) 
As staff level changes and affects pro- 
ductivity, project N’s cost and schedule 
change. Table 2 compares the initial 
and adapted estimates. 
The drop in the overall productivity 
is caused by inefficiencies in the adapt- 
ed staffing profile (which, in turn, was a 
response to the initial staffing con- 
straint). This is a team-learning effect. 
As a project proceeds, team members 
learn more about the project and the 
development process. The more they 
learn, the more productive they become 
- up to a point. The earlier in the 
SDLC that all members become trained, 
the higher the overall project produc- 
tivity. The delayed acquisition of the 
bulk of the project’s staff in the adapted 
plan means fewer staff members will 
perform at their peak for less time over 
the SDLC. 
Furthermore, in the adapted plan the 
project’s staff builds to a significantly 
higher level than in the original plan. As 
the team size grows, the number of hu- 
man intercommunication paths tends 
to increase to provide for proper coor- 
dination among program modules. Gen- 
erally, individual productivity will tend 
to decrease and overall effort will tend 
to increase. 
If projects N and 0 were two sub- 
systems of a single project, manage- 
ment would have some added flexibili- 
ty. For example, project 0’s scheduled 
completion date could be extended to 
approximately coincide with the com- 
pletion date of project N .  There would 
be no additional delay in the total project 
completion, and staffing would be more 
balanced. Figure 4b shows this adapta- 
tion. Note that project N finishes on 
schedule (in 348 days) and regains most 
of its productivity (see Table 3). 
Productivity 
Type of cost  Duration (DSI Per 
Estimate (Person-days) (Days) Person-day) 
Initial estimates 3,593 348 17.8 
Adapted estimates 4,494 395 14.2 
Table 3. Project N finishes on schedule (348 days) and regains most of its pro- 
ductivity. 
Productivity 
Type of cost  Duration (DSI* Per 
Estimate (Person-days) (Days) Person-day ) 
Initial estimates 3,593 348 17.8 
Adapted estimates (1) 4,494 395 14.2 
Adapted estimates (2) 3,660 348 17.5 
20& 15 
0 1 00 200 300 395 
l ime  (Days) 
I I I I 
R 810-  
. . . ............................. . ?....... . ............ ................... ....... . ......... . . .- 
100 200 300348 0 
. ?.....  .  
.................  
(b) Time (Days) 
- Workforce (N) ... Workforce (0) ............ Staff transfers to N 
Figure 4. Adapting staffing plan for projects 0 and N: (a) Plan No. I; (b) Plan 
No. 2. 
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Figure 6. Cost/schedule trade-off at day 200. 
Correcting estimates to reflect prod- 
uct-size changes. Undersizing (that is, 
the tendency to underestimate the size 
of the software system being developed) 
is a critical roadblock to accurate soft- 
ware estimation. 
Consider a scenario in which project 
N s  size experiences a 50 percent up- 
ward adjustment during development 
(that is, growing from 64 KDSI to 96 
KDSI). As growth occurs, the estimates 
must be updated. In contrast to a tradi- 
tional estimation tool, the hybrid model 
allows the estimates to be updated con- 
tinuously, not merely at the major project 
milestones. Figure 5 depicts the adjust- 
ments to project N’s size, cost, schedule, 
and workforce up to day 200. 
In the Figure 5 scenario, note how 
project N’s scheduled completion date 
remains stable even as the project’s size 
increases. Corrections are, instead, made 
to the project’s workforce level. This 
type of correction is not atypical. For 
example, at AT&T’s Bell Laboratories 
the long-lead-time commitment of con- 
tent and schedule on software projects 
severely constrains management’s abil- 
ity to alter the schedule early in the life 
cycle. “If it turns out that parts of the 
project were underestimated, it is diffi- 
cult to alter schedules or product con- 
tent,” according to Taff, Borchering, 
and Hudgins.’ “Management can only 
add resources to meet the commitment.” 
DeMarco found political pressures cause 
similar behaviors in a number of organi- 
zations.” 
Nevertheless, maintaining the 
project’s initial schedule even as the 
project’s size is adjusted upwards con- 
stitutes an implici t  compression of 
project schedule. That, in turn, raises 
the questions: Is this implicit schedule 
compression feasible? If it is, is it eco- 
nomically justifiable? Without a con- 
tinuous estimation capability, it is ex- 
tremely difficult for software developers 
and their customers to find convincing 
answers to these questions. 
According to Boehm, an important 
utility of estimation models is their abil- 
ity to “support a family of estimates or 
a sensitivity ana ly~is .”~  Using Cocomo, 
the project manager can, for example, 
conduct a cost/schedule trade-off anal- 
ysis to assess the feasibility of schedule 
compressions and their impact on project 
cost. The limitation, however, is that 
such an analysis can only be done for 
the initial estimates and for the SDLC 
in toto. Cocomo’s cost/schedule calcu- 
lations “assume that the project manag- 
er knows about any required schedule 
acceleration or stretch-out in advance, 
and is able to plan and control the project 
in the most cost-effective way with re- 
spect to an off-nominal s c h e d ~ l e . ” ~  
Cocomo’s life-cycle cost/schedule re- 
lationships cannot be distributed across 
the SDLC (for example, using its SDLC 
phase distributions of effort and sched- 
ule) to conduct the analysis during the 
project for the individual phases. To 
understand why, assume that the oppo- 
site is true - that is, that Cocomo’s life- 
cycle cost/schedule relationships can be 
distributed across the SDLC with val- 
ues assigned to each individual phase. 
This would imply that, for example, the 
testing phase’s schedule can always be 
compressed by Xpercent at an identical 
offsetting cost increase of some Y per- 
cent, irrespective of when the schedule 
compression decision is made. Thus, the 
decision could be made before the 
project starts as part of the initial plan, 
or just before the testing phase starts as 
a reaction to an unexpected delay in the 
programming phase - with the same 
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results. However, empirical evidence 
indicates that not only will the cost be 
higher in the latter case, but that it 
might even be infeasible to compress 
the schedule at all so late in the life 
cycle. 
The system dynamics simulator has 
been used to investigate the impact of 
late staff additions on project cost and 
schedule.’O The results indicate that the 
net cumulative contribution of a newly 
acquired staff member could be posi- 
tive or negative. Net contribution de- 
termines whether the project’s sched- 
ule can be successfully compressed late 
in the life cycle. We must calculate the 
net contribution because an additional 
person’s contribution to useful project 
work must be balanced against the staff 
resources that will be lost in training 
and communicating with the new staff 
member. 
We must calculate the cumulative 
contribution. A new person’s net con- 
tribution might be initially negative. But 
as training takes effect and the new 
person’s productivity increases, the net 
contribution will become less negative 
and eventually (given enough training) 
the new person will start contributing 
positively. Only if the cumulative im- 
pact is negative will addition of the new 
staff member translate into a longer 
project completion time. 
By providing a facility to conduct these 
calculations dynamically within a simu- 
lation, the hybrid model allows man- 
agement to conduct costlschedule trade- 
off analyses on a virtually continuous 
basis. Estimations can be obtained for 
any part of the SDLC. Figure 6 reflects 
the cost/schedule trade-off conducted 
at day 200. The results show that main- 
taining the original schedule of 348 is 
infeasible. The earliest possible com- 
pletion time is 409 days at a cost of 
10,450 person-days. 
Perfecting estimation through post- 
mortem experimentation. In a NASA 
postmortem, the dynamic behaviors of 
two concurrent software projects were 
studied in detail. The NASA-A and 
NASA-B projects (not actual names) 
involved the design, implementation, 
and testing of software systems for pro- 
cessing telemetry data and providing 
attitude determination and control for 
the NASA-A and NASA-B satellites, 
respectively. Because the two space- 
craft were not identical (for example, 
they had different sensors, telemetry, 
Table 4. Initial estimates and actual project results. 
I Project Initial Estimates Actual Results 1 
NASA-A 
Size (KDSI) 16.0 24.4 
Cost (Person-days) 1,100 2,239 
Schedule (Working days) 320 380 
Size (KDSI) 19.6 25.7 
NASA-B 
Cost (Person-days) 1,345 2,200 




.................... ......... _... ................................... 
.................. ............ ........... 
End of system testing 
Ann 0 100 200 300 380 
............ (3) cost 
(Person-days) 
Figure 7. Project behavior: (a) NASA-A; (b) NASA-B. 
and orbits), two sets of requirements 
were produced for two separate soft- 
ware support systems. Table 4 shows 
initial estimates and actual project re- 
sults. 
Figure7 illustrates how the staff, cost, 
and schedule variables for the two 
projects changed during their SDLCs. 
Note how management on both projects 
resisted adjusting the projects’ sched- 
March 1993 27 
Authorized licensed use limited to: NPS Dudley Knox Library. Downloaded on December 01,2021 at 20:53:03 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
I I 
Figure 8. Use of historical project statistics: (a) current practice and (b) pro- 
posed normalization strategy. 
Figure 9. Impact of decreasing initial estimates on cost. 
uled completion dates during most of 
the development, even as the projects’ 
sizes were adjusted upwards. Instead, 
in the earlier phases, adjustments 
were made to the projects’ workforce 
levels. 
NASA-A’s workforce pattern is atyp- 
ical. Workforce buildups tend to follow 
a concave curve that rises, peaks, and 
then drops back to lower levels as a 
project proceeds toward the system- 
testing phase. Two factors explain 
NASA-A’s workforce pattern. First, the 
project was under serious schedule pres- 
sure, partially because its size was ini- 
tially underestimated. The problem was 
complicated by the fact that NASA-A’s 
software was required to be accepted 
and frozen 90 days before the satellite’s 
launch date. As a result, serious sched- 
ule slippages were not tolerated. As the 
launch date approached, pressures de- 
veloped that overrode normal work- 
force stability considerations. That is, 
management became willing to “pay 
any price” to avoid overshooting the 
pre-launch target. As Figure 7 indicates, 
this translated into a management that 
was increasingly willing to add more 
people. 
Serendipitously, the NASA-B project 
was winding down, hence its staff was 
available for quick transfer to NASA- 
A. This explains why the NASA-A 
project staff increase was so dramatic. 
As standard procedure at this NASA 
flight center, a postmortem was con- 
ducted to evaluate the project experi- 
ence and document the lessons learned. 
In addition, the project results were in- 
corporated into the center’s database of 
historical project statistics. This data- 
base supports the development, cali- 
bration, and fine-tuning of the center’s 
software estimation models (see Figure 
sa). The underlying assumption here is 
that such project results constitute the 
most preferred and reliable benchmarks 
for future estimation purposes since they 
are actual values. 
However, considering NASA-A’s 
project history, the project’s final cost 
of 2,200 person-days might not be a 
desirable benchmark for future esti- 
mates. The value reflects staffing ineffi- 
ciencies incurred as a result of initial 
undersizing. The next time a project 
similar in size (24.4 KDSI) to NASA-A 
is undertaken, a more effective staffing 
plan could be devised that avoids a last- 
minute staff explosion. As a result, the 
new project should require less than 
2,200 person-days to accomplish. 
Note that I usedthewordshould rather 
than would. If NASA-A’s (inflated) 
2,200person-days value was adopted as 
the benchmark for estimating the new 
24.4 KDSI project, the organization 
might not realize any savings. The rea- 
son: The self-fulfilling prophecy of Par- 
kinson’s law, which says work on a soft- 
ware project can expand in many 
different forms to fill the available time. 
Work expansion could take the form 
of goldplating (that is, adding features 
to the software product that make the 
job bigger and more expensive but which 
provide little or no utility in practice), 
or it could take the form of an increase 
in nonproductive slack-time a~t iv i t ies .~  
What is needed is a strategy that cap- 
italizes on NASA-A’s (learning) expe- 
rience by wringing out the cost excesses 
caused by the initial undersizing and 
that derives a posterior set of normal- 
ized cost and schedule estimation bench- 
marks (see Figure 8b). 
The hybrid model developed for this 
study is an appropriate tool for this 
task. By using it as a “laboratory” for 
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conducting controlled experimentation, 
the effect of changing one factor can be 
observed while all other factors are held 
unchanged. 
Specifically, the strategy involves re- 
simulation of the NASA-A project with 
no undersizing. In multiple simulation 
runs, the initial schedule estimate was 
held constant at 380 days, while the 
initial cost estimate was gradually de- 
creased from the actual value of 2,200 
person-days (see Figure 9). The x axis 
depicts the different initial cost (per- 
son-day) estimates, while the y axis de- 
picts the project’s final (simulated) cost 
in person-days. 
The results indicate that using NASA- 
A’s (inflated) raw experience value of 
2,200 person-days would indeed be 
wasteful. As the initial person-day esti- 
mate for the project is gradually low- 
ered, savings are achieved as wasteful 
project practices decrease. This contin- 
ues until an initial cost estimate of about 
1,900 person-days is reached. 
Lowering the project’s initial cost es- 
timate below this point becomes coun- 
terproductive because the project not 
only sheds all its excess but begins to  
suffer the effects of underestimation. 
Initial underestimation is costly because 
it leads to an initial understaffing, fol- 
lowed by a costly staff buildup later in 
the life cycle. (This is exactly what hap- 
pened with NASA-A.) 
This indicates that the widely held 
notion that raw historical project re- 
sults are a preferred benchmark for fu- 
ture estimation is flawed. In the NASA- 
A case, a 1,900person-day value is clearly 
a more preferred benchmark (for inclu- 
sion in the normalized database of his- 
torical project results) over NASA-A’s 
raw 2,200 person-day cost. The simula- 
tions indicate that the normalized cost 
estimate and its associated staffing plan 
would reduce NASA’s cost on the new 
project by about 10 percent. 
A according to Boehm, “Good software cost estimation is not an end in itself, but rather a 
means toward more effective software 
life-cycle management.”4 Indeed, with- 
out a reliable software estimation capa- 
bility, effective project planning and 
control is next to impossible. Software 
estimates provide the basis for planning 
what resources to commit to a project 
and, in retrospect, for judging how well 
these resources were used. 
The hybrid model I discussed is the 
focus of two ongoing research efforts. 
In the first, the model is deployed on a 
two-year project to  develop a two- 
subsystem space application at NASA’s 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The objec- 
tive of this research exercise is to assess 
the impact of continuous estimation 
using the hybrid model on managerial 
decision-making and in turn, on soft- 
ware project performance. The model 
is being used to support the design and 
coding phases of subsystem 1, while sub- 
system 2, being developed in parallel, 
will be managed using traditional mod- 
els. 
The objective of the second research 
effort is to investigate possible enhance- 
ments to the model’s continuous esti- 
mation-correcting capabilities. For ex- 
ample, a statistical analysis of historical 
project profiles is being conducted to 
quantify effort and schedule relation- 
ships between the different phases of 
the SDLC (for example, correlations 
between design effort and coding ef- 
fort). In addition, the JPL staff is in- 
vestigating possible structures to syn- 
thesize managerial judgement with 
statistical methods to make mid-project 
corrections. 
All real-life estimation requires exer- 
cising some judgement. One major re- 
search issue in this effort is the extent to 
which managerial judgement should be 
used at the different phases of the SDLC. 
Another is how the interaction of judge- 
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